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Abstract In his recent John Locke Lectures – published as Between Saying and Doing
– Brandom extends and refines his views on the nature of language and philosophy by
developing a position that he calls Analytic Pragmatism. Although Brandom’s project
bears on an extraordinarily rich array of different philosophical issues, we focus here on
the contention that certain vocabularies have a privileged status within our linguistic
practices, and that when adequately understood, the practices in which these vocabu-
laries figure can help furnish us with an account of semantic intentionality. Brandom’s
claim is that such vocabularies are privileged because they are a species of what he calls
universal LX vocabulary –roughly, vocabulary whose mastery is implicit in any
linguistic practice whatsoever. We show that, contrary to Brandom’s claim, logical
vocabulary per se fails to satisfy the conditions that must be met for something to count
as universal LX vocabulary. Further, we show that exactly analogous considerations
undermine his claim that modal vocabulary is universal LX. If our arguments are
sound, then, contrary to what Brandommaintains, intentionality cannot be explicated as
a Bpragmatically mediated semantic phenomenon^, at any rate not of the sort that he
proposes.
Keywords Pragmatism .Conceptual analysis . Logic .Conditionals . LogicalConstants .
Intentionality
1 Introduction
Over the past three decades or so, Robert Brandom has exerted an enormous influence
on debates regarding the nature of language and philosophy. In his recent John Locke
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Lectures – published as Between Saying and Doing – Brandom further extends and
refines his views on these matters by seeking to develop and defend a position that he
calls Analytic Pragmatism. As we will see, this position combines two commitments
that are exceedingly widely endorsed amongst analytic philosophers; and a careful
discussion of the resulting view is of importance if for no other reason than, to date,
Brandom’s position constitutes the most detailed and systematic endeavor to develop
such a view.
Although Brandom’s project bears on an extraordinarily rich array of different philo-
sophical issues, we focus here on a single central strand that runs throughout, and without
which the project as awhole fails. In brief, the strand in question concerns the contention that
certain vocabularies have a privileged status within our linguistic practices, and that when
adequately understood, the practices in which these vocabularies figure can help furnish us
with an account of semantic intentionality. More specifically, we focus on Brandom’s
discussion of two vocabularies that have long figured prominently in analytic philosophy:
logical vocabulary – especially the conditional – and modal vocabulary, such as that used to
express necessity and possibility.1 Brandom’s claim is that such vocabularies are privileged
because they are a species of what he calls universal LX vocabulary –roughly, vocabulary
whosemastery is implicit in any linguistic practicewhatsoever. On such a view, then, logical
and modal vocabularies are privileged because they possess a kind of transcendental status.
Further, according to Brandom, this transcendental status, at least in the case of modal
vocabulary, is important to characterizing the sort of intentionality essential to thought and
language.
This paper has three main aims. First, we show that logical vocabulary per se fails to
satisfy the conditions that must be met for something to count as universal LX
vocabulary. We focus in particular on the case of the conditional, which Brandom
takes to be a paradigmatic example of logical vocabulary. If our argument goes though,
then the conditional is not universal LX, and Brandom’s efforts to defend the privileged
status of logic per se fail. Second, we show that exactly analogous considerations
undermine the claim that modal vocabulary is universal LX. If this is so, then another of
Brandom’s central claims is undermined –what he calls themodal Kant-Sellars thesis –
the thesis that the use of ordinary, empirical vocabulary presupposes those capacities
required for the introduction and deployment of modal vocabulary. Finally, we argue
briefly that given our criticism of the modal Kant-Sellars thesis, Brandom’s conception
of intentionality, which he articulates in the final pages of his Locke Lectures, is also
untenable. If our arguments are sound, then, contrary to what Brandom maintains,
intentionality cannot be explicated as a Bpragmatically mediated semantic
phenomenon^,2 at any rate not of the sort that he proposes.
Here is how we proceed. In Section 1, we provide an overview of Brandom’s
Analytic Pragmatism. In Section 2, we focus on the notion of universal LX vocabulary,
and both explain what it is and why is it so important to Brandom’s overarching project.
In Section 3, we set out Brandom’s case for the conditional being universal LX. Then in
Section 4, we present our criticisms of this case; and in Section 5, we turn our attention
to modal vocabulary and argue that considerations exactly analogous to those discussed
in Section 4 also undermine the modal Kant-Sellars thesis. Finally, in Section 6, we
1 Following Brandom, we are interested here in aleithic modality as opposed to epistemic modality.
2 Brandom (2008: 189).
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draw out the implications of the forgoing discussion for Brandom’s account of
intentionality.
2 Analytic Pragmatism
Brandom’s overall project – what he calls Analytic Pragmatism – can be thought of as a
consequence of endorsing two commitments. The first is a methodological commit-
ment, which he takes to be central to traditional analytic philosophy:
The Analytic Project: A central goal of philosophy ought to be to establish
semantic relations between vocabularies – kinds of linguistic expressions – in
order to Bmake sense of the meanings expressed by one kind of locution in terms
of the meanings expressed by another kind of locution^.3 Paradigmatically, these
semantic relations include translation, paraphrase, a priori entailment, and truth-
making.
The history of analytic philosophy is, of course, littered with attempts to produce
such analyses —including, the reduction of arithmetic to logic, the translation of
psychological vocabulary into physical vocabulary, and the analysis of moral vocabu-
lary in non-moral terms. By endorsing this commitment, then, Brandom locates his
position as continuous with the project of traditional analytic philosophy.
Brandom’s second central commitment is a general thesis about the metaphysics
of meaning:
Semantic Pragmatism: The meaning of a linguistic expression is determined by
its use in a linguistic practice.
This sort of meaning pragmatism has also been prominent in the history of analytic
philosophy. Though we suspect that many proponents of the analytic project have also
endorsed Semantic Pragmatism, far from being a natural complement to the Analytic
Project, such pragmatism poses, as Brandom notes, a serious challenge to it. The
challenge takes a variety of forms, but the rough idea is this: If our practices determine
the meanings of linguistic expressions, then it is highly implausible to suppose that
expressions comprising different vocabularies – and, hence, having different meaning-
determining practices – will tend to bear systematic semantic relations to each other,
such as translation, reduction and paraphrase. Thus by endorsing both the Analytic
Project and Semantic Pragmatism, Brandom seeks to combine a pair of commitments
that seem to be in tension with each other. As a consequence, a central challenge for
Brandom – and one that exerts an enormous influence on the overall shape of his
Analytic Pragmatism – is to reconcile this apparent tension: to show that, contrary to
appearances, one can pursue the goal of philosophical analysis at the same time as
cleaving to Semantic Pragmatism.
3 Brandom (2008: 1).
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How is this to be done? Brandom’s solution is to propose that Semantic Pragmatism
requires that we rethink the fundamental semantic relations between the analyzed and
analyzing vocabularies in philosophical analyses. Specifically, he proposes that if
linguistic meaning is determined by use, then the relationship between distinct vocab-
ularies should be mediated by linguistic practices.4 Thus, for Brandom, the way to be a
pragmatist and to pursue the Analytic Project is to take the analyzing vocabulary to
describe those practices that are sufficient to deploy the target vocabulary. If one could
make good on this suggestion, then semantic pragmatists could have their analytic
cake, and eat it too.
3 Universal LX Vocabulary
So far we have sketched the overarching shape of Brandom’s project. But why does the
notion of universal LX vocabulary come to play such a central role?
3.1 Why Universal LX Vocabulary Matters
There are two quite different roles that the notion of universal LX vocabulary plays in
Brandom’s project. The first, exemplified by its application to logic, is to justify parts of
the analyzing base that everyone must presuppose in order to pursue the Analytic
Project. The second, exemplified by Brandom’s discussion of modality, is to justify or
vindicate the use of philosophically contested notions. In both sorts of case, however,
Brandom maintains that the response should be the same. Roughly, where some
vocabulary – contested or otherwise – is universal LX, we get it for free since the
capacity to master that vocabulary is a necessary condition for the possibility of any
language-use whatsoever. Let us consider the cases of logical vocabulary and modality
in a bit more detail.
Logic One way to make vivid the potential significance of the notion of universal LX
vocabulary for analytic philosophy is to note, as Brandom does, that within any project
of analysis – classical or pragmatist – logical vocabulary has a privileged status.
Roughly put, no matter what the analysandum, it is taken for granted that logical
vocabulary must be part of the analyzing base. If, for example, one seeks to translate
psychological vocabulary into physical vocabulary, it is not merely that one uses the
substantive terms of physics; one also uses – and indeed must use – such logical
resources as conjunction, disjunction, quantifiers, and of course the conditional. But if
this is so, then as Brandom notes, some justification or explanation is required for why
logical vocabulary should have this privileged status. The notion of universal LX
vocabulary is central to Brandom’s effort to address this challenge. Logical vocabulary
is supposed to be privileged because it is a species of universal LX vocabulary, and
universal LX vocabulary is supposed to be privileged.
4 Terminological note: Brandom tends variously to use the expressions ‘practice’, ‘activity’, ‘ability’, ‘exercise
of a practice’, and ‘practice-or-ability’ more-or-less interchangeably; see Brandom (2008: 9). For simplicity
and ease of exposition we just use the term ‘practice’.
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Modality At least since Locke, modal vocabulary has been a point of contention
within philosophy, especially amongst those of an empiricist bent.5 Suspicion of alethic
modality traditionally comes in at least three forms. First, there are commonplace
epistemic concerns regarding how we can come to know – or justifiably believe –
modal claims. Second, there are familiar metaphysical concerns about the Bweirdness^
of an ontology that allows for modal truths that are not merely truths of language.
Finally, empiricists have long questioned the intelligibility of modal locutions
—what claims to possibility or necessity might even mean. Despite these
familiar concerns there has been, as Brandom notes, something of a sea change
in philosophical attitudes towards modality in recent decades, in large measure
due to developments in the formal semantics of modal logics. Nonetheless,
Brandom argues – and we are inclined to agree – that such developments leave
largely unaddressed the original philosophical challenges to modality. It is here
that the notion of universal LX vocabulary is supposed to enter the picture. For
if modal locutions are universal LX, then no matter what philosophical puzzle-
ment accompanies them, they ought to be construed as holding a privileged and
legitimate status. Modal vocabulary is supposed to be privileged because it is a
species of universal LX vocabulary, and universal LX vocabulary is supposed
to be privileged.
3.2 What Universal LX Vocabulary is and Why It Matters
We now need to say more about Brandom’s notion of universal LX vocabulary. Here is
a first pass. Universal LX vocabulary is supposed to be a privileged class of linguistic
expressions in that they satisfy the following two conditions:
a) The vocabulary allows one to describe practices that are necessary for having
mastery for any vocabulary whatsoever, and
b) Once one masters the described practice, one can in principle deploy the very
vocabulary used to describe it.
Crudely put, Universal LX vocabulary describes the necessary conditions for mastery
of any linguistic expression whatsoever, including universal LX vocabulary itself.
Even this rough formulation is a bit of a mouthful. But to understand clearly
Brandom’s notion of universal LX vocabulary we need to explain several additional
notions. First, we need to explain two notions of autonomy. The first is the notion of an
autonomous vocabulary. To a first approximation: A vocabulary is autonomous if and
only if one could use it even though one could use no other vocabulary whatsoever.
Suppose, for example, that it was possible to master the language of arithmetic and
nothing else. Then the language of arithmetic would be an autonomous vocabulary in
the relevant sense. The second notion of autonomy – an autonomous practice – can be
defined in terms of the previous notion. To a first approximation: an autonomous
practice is any practice that is sufficient for mastery of an autonomous vocabulary.
5 The same is, of course, true of normative vocabulary—a topic in which Brandom also invests much time in
his Locke lectures.
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As we will soon see, the paired notions of an autonomous vocabulary and an
autonomous practice are important because they are required in order to specify
what is it for a LX vocabulary to be universal. But we are getting ahead of
ourselves. Before explaining what makes an LX vocabulary universal, we first
need to explain what makes a vocabulary LX, and this in turn requires that we
characterize a range of what Brandom calls meaning-use relations. Given the
project of Analytic Pragmatism – to specify relations between vocabularies that
are mediated by practices – Brandom appeals to a number of such relations:
1) PV-Sufficiency: Where one has mastery of any vocabulary – autonomous or
otherwise – Brandom supposes that there must be some set of practices that
suffices for mastery of that vocabulary. He calls this relation PV-sufficien-
cy. Roughly: a practice is PV-sufficient for a vocabulary just in case one
has mastery of the vocabulary, if one engages in that practice.
2) PV-Necessity: Now suppose that for some vocabulary there is a practice that one
must engage in to count as having mastery of the vocabulary. Suppose, for
example, that the capacity to identify the successor of any natural number is
required for mastery of the language of arithmetic. Then this practice – identifying
successors – would be PV-necessary for mastery of arithmetic vocabulary.
3) VP-Sufficiency: This relation between vocabularies and practices obtains when a
practice can be specified in a particular vocabulary. That is, a vocabulary is VP-
sufficient for a practice just in case that practice can be described using that
vocabulary.6
4) PP-Sufficiency: The fourth relation that we consider here obtains between prac-
tices. If, when one engages in a particular practice, one can in principle do
everything needed to engage in some other practice, then the former is PP-
sufficient for the latter. For example, perhaps being able to add any three
numbers between 0 and 9 is PP-sufficient for being able to find the sum of
any two numbers by the usual method of addition. In characterizing PP-
sufficiency, Brandom tends to express a preference for using the framework
of computational theory, but there is no reason to think that this is essential
to the notion.7
5) PP-Necessity: The final relation we consider is also a relation between practices.
One practice is PP-necessary for another if it is impossible to engage in the second
without engaging in the first. For example, the practice of asserting is PP-necessary
for the practice of asserting conditionals.
With this terminology in hand, we can now provide a more explicit formu-
lation of LX vocabulary. A vocabulary V1 is LX for a vocabulary V2 iff there
exists practices P1 and P2, such that:
(a) P2 is PV-necessary for V2,
(b) P2 is PP-sufficient for P1,
6 We discuss this relation in far greater detail in Section 4.1.
7 See Brandom (2008: ch. 2).
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(c) P1 is PV-sufficient for V1,
(d) V1 is VP-sufficient for P2.
In effect, what this says is that V1 specifies a practice P2 that one must be able to
master in order to be a competent user of another vocabulary V2 and, moreover, the
practice P2 incorporates everything that is required, in principle, in order to engage in a
practice that the use of V1 depends upon –i.e., P1. This set of conditions can be
captured, perhaps more intuitively, in what Brandom calls a meaning-use diagram
(see Fig. 1).
Finally, we are in position to characterize the notion of universal LX
vocabulary. A vocabulary is universal LX iff it is an LX vocabulary for any
autonomous vocabulary. We can capture this in terms of an additional meaning-
use relation:
(e) P2 is PP-necessary for any autonomous practice – i.e. a practice that is PV-
sufficient for an autonomous vocabulary.
Thus if a vocabulary satisfies the conditions (i.e., (a)-(e)) for being universal LX,
then not only are the practices it describes necessary for being a language user of any
sort, but the practices so described also suffice for mastery of the universal LX
vocabulary itself. As Brandom puts it for the case of logic, Banyone who can talk at
all, hence can deploy any base vocabulary, can already do everything one needs to be
Fig. 1 General meaning-use diagram for LX Vocabulary
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able to do in order in principle to be able to say what logical vocabulary lets one say.^8
We might add that if Brandom is correct, then the same is true for modal (and
normative) vocabulary as well.
4 Logic as Universal LX: The Case of the Conditional
It is time to consider how the notion of universal LX vocabulary is supposed to
apply to Brandom’s paradigmatic example of a logical expression: the condi-
tional. In order for the conditional to be universal LX, it must be LX for any
autonomous vocabulary whatsoever. So, applying the definition from
Section 2.2, let us assume that V2 is any arbitrary autonomous vocabulary,
and V1 is the conditional. Moreover, let us follow Brandom as characterizing
P1 as the practice of using the conditional, and P2 as the practice of inferring
one claim from another. In which case, again following Brandom, there are five
conditions—represented by the meaning-use diagram in Fig. 2—that need to be
satisfied.
Condition 1. According to the first condition: P2, the practice of inferring one claim
from another, is PV-necessary for the autonomous vocabulary, V2. In other words, one
must be able to infer one claim from another in order to count as using any vocabulary
whatsoever. This is a central tenet of Brandom’s inferentialism on which the capacity to
draw inferences is a metaphysically necessary condition on being a concept-user –
hence language-user – of any sort.9 As Brandom puts it:
Assertions are essentially, and not just accidentally, speech acts that can play the
role both of premises and as conclusions of inferences… According to this way
of thinking, inferential practices are PP-necessary components of every autono-
mous discursive practice, hence PV-necessary for the deployment of every
autonomous vocabulary, hence PV-necessary for the deployment of every vocab-
ulary whatsoever.10
Though there are those who might wish to take issue with this claim, in what follows
we grant this assumption, at least for the sake of argument.
Condition 2. The second condition concerns a relationship between practices.
According to Brandom: P2, the practice of inferring, is PP-sufficient for P1, the practice of
using the conditional. In other words, if a person can infer one claim from another, then she
can, at least in principle, do everything that she needs to be able to do to count as having
mastery of the conditional. Again, Brandom’s inferentialism, and the connection it assumes
between asserting and inferring, is central here. According to this view, if we begin with an
agent that can assert and infer, then:
…we can teach it also to produce-assertively tokenings of the new form Bif p then
q.^…The system must respond to its assertion of the conditional Bif p then q^ by
8 Brandom (2008: 52-53).
9 See Brandom (1994).
10 Brandom (2008: 42-43).
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treating the inference from p to q as a good one—for instance, by being disposed
to endorse q assertionally if it is disposed to endorse p assertionally… In a clear
sense, then, the capacity to distinguish good from bad inferences involving non-
logical sentences is (PP-) sufficient for the ability to deploy conditionals involving
those sentences.11
Condition 3. According to the third condition that needs to be satisfied for ‘If__,
then__’ to be universal LX: P1, the practice of using conditionals, is PV-sufficient for
mastery of V1, conditional vocabulary. This is true given the definitions of P1 and V1.
Condition 4. The fourth condition on ‘If__, then__’ being universal LX is that the
vocabulary of conditionals permits us to specify adequately the practice of inferring. In
other words: V1, the vocabulary of conditionals, is VP-sufficient for P2, the practice of
inferring. This condition is captured by the diagonal arrow in Fig. 2. Notice that the
existence of such VP-relations is crucial to the overall success of Brandom’s Analytic
Pragmatism. For precisely what VP-sufficiency does is establish practice-mediated rela-
tions between pairs of vocabularies. In other words, without VP-sufficiency we would be
unable to provide a practice-mediated analysis of one vocabulary in terms of another. In
the present case, conditional vocabulary is taken to provide a means of specifying the
practice of inference making, and thereby Bmake explicit^ what was only implicit in the
practice of drawing inferences. As Brandom puts it: BConditionals make explicit
11 Brandom (2008: 45).
Fig. 2 Our meaning-use diagrams differ from Brandom’s in that we list the PP-necessity relation as an arrow
instead of as inclusion. See Fig. 1.9 on Brandom (2008: 28)
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something that otherwise was implicit in the practical sorting of non-logical inferences into
good and bad.^12
Condition 5: If a vocabulary meets conditions 1–4, then it is LX. The final
condition, which renders it universal LX, is that the practice of inferring is PP-
necessary for any autonomous practice. In other words, every language-user must be
proficient at inferring. Again, this is controversial; but we grant it here, at least for the
sake of argument.
To summarize: Brandom maintains that conditionals are universal LX because they
satisfy all of the above conditions. The burden of the next section is to show that he is
mistaken.
5 Conditionals are Not Universal LX
Our complaint against Brandom’s treatment of the conditional is threefold. First,
we maintain that there are two quite different readings of VP-sufficiency and
that there are serious problems with the claim that conditionals are, in the sense
relevant to the Analytic Project, VP-sufficient for the practice of inferring.
Second, even if the first objection is waived, we maintain that PP-sufficiency
(i.e., Condition 2) fails. Third, even if one supplements the account so that
Condition 2 holds, Condition 4 fails; and moreover it fails no matter which of
the two readings of VP-sufficiency one adopts. Thus, we maintain that even if
conditionals are VP-sufficient for the practice of inferring, it still follows that
conditionals are not Universal LX.
5.1 Descriptive and Expressive Notions of VP-Sufficiency
The first problem arises from the fact that Brandom’s discussion incorporates two rather
different construals of VP-sufficiency: what we call the descriptive and expressive
readings. The problem for Brandom is that, on the one hand, only the descriptive
reading will do the work required by Analytic Pragmatism, whilst on other the other
hand, conditionals can, at most, provide the basis for the expressive form of VP-
sufficiency. Let us explain this in more detail.
As characterized by Brandom, the objective of Analytic Pragmatism is to provide
pragmatic analyses—i.e., to specify, in one vocabulary, the practices that determine the
content of another vocabulary. This is precisely the role that VP-sufficiency is supposed
to play within the broader project. But talk of Bspecifying^ appears, given the context,
to involve describing a set of practices. Indeed, his paradigm cases of VP-sufficiency
confirm this impression. For example, Brandom glosses what he calls the Kaplan-
Stalnaker semantics for indexicals by saying the following:
[It provides a] purely non-indexical vocabulary [that] can serve as an adequate
pragmatic metavocabulary for indexical vocabulary. That is, one can say (that is,
describe), in wholly non-indexical terms, everything one needs to do in order to
12 Brandom (2008: 46).
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use indexical vocabulary. Non-indexical vocabulary is VP-sufficient to specify
practices-or-abilities PV-sufficient to deploy indexical vocabulary.13
In short: VP-sufficiency, on this descriptive construal, involves the description of
linguistic practices.
Let us turn to the second, expressive construal of VP-sufficiency. On this view, VP-
sufficiency need not involve the description of practices. Instead it consists in one
vocabulary making explicit what is only implicit in a linguistic practice. Very roughly,
one makes explicit a linguistic practice or ability when one introduces an expression
into the language that allows us to formulate claims about – and rationally assess –
performances of the practice.14 To take a relatively simple example, Brandom claims in
some earlier work that the negation sign renders explicit what would otherwise only be
implicit in our linguistic practices — namely, treating two claims as incompatible. As
he puts it:
Negation, as a logical connective supporting formally valid inferences, plays the
same explicitating role with respect to material incompatability relations among
judgeable (that is propositional) contents that the conditional plays with respect to
the material inferential relations among such contents.15
On this expressive construal of VP-sufficiency, then, no description need occur.
The problem is that a vocabulary that only makes explicit some feature of a practice need
not describe that practice. Yet precisely what pragmatic analyses seem to require is a
description of the practices. One way to see the point is to consider the pragmatic Banalysis^
that would result from merely making explicit the practice of treating two claims as
incompatible. If all that were required for VP-sufficiency was that this be made explicit,
then the Banalysis^would consist in oneword: not! By any lights, such a result would not be
an analysis worthy of the name. But it should be clear that conditionals can nomore describe
the practice of inference than the negation sign can describe the practice of treating-as-
incompatible. Instead, what it more plausibly does, is make some element(s) or aspect(s) of
the practice explicit. And indeed, this is what Brandom ends up emphasizingwhen he argues
for the claim that conditionals are universal LX.16 Our complaint, in short, is that Brandom
slides from a descriptive notion of VP-sufficiency that cannot be met by conditional
vocabulary to an expressive conception of VP-sufficiency that can be played by the
conditional but which is not fit for the purposes of Analytic Pragmatism.
5.2 Inferring, Asserting and Inferring-and-Asserting
Let us waive the previous objection for the sake of argument. Still, there is another –
and in our view more serious – problem for the claim that conditionals are VP-
13 Brandom (2008: 56).
14 Brandom’s notion of making explicit is a notoriously hard one to articulate precisely. The present way of
formulating the idea might sound as if making a practice explicit consists in producing a name for that practice.
For reasons that we need not go into here, however, it is quite clear that this is not Brandom’s intention.
Moreover, it is clearly false that logical expressions, such as negation, are names for practices.
15 Brandom (1994: 115).
16 Brandom (2008: 44-47).
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sufficient for the practice of inferring. Here the problem concerns how to understand
the bottom right-hand interior box in Fig. 2. According to Brandom’s characterization
of conditionals as universal LX, the practice of inferring is supposed to be PP-sufficient
for the practice of using conditionals. But this cannot be right. For, in order to have
mastery of conditionals, one must also be able to engage in the practice of asserting.
This is a point that Brandom would himself readily endorse and for a general and rather
obvious reason: a language user who is incapable of assertion would be no language
user at all. But if this is so, then the practice of inferring is not PP-sufficient for the
practice of using conditionals, and so conditionals (on this construal of the diagram) are
not universal LX.
Now, it should be clear what is going on here. Brandom is assuming that the
practices of asserting and inferring go together. As he puts it: Bthe beginning of
wisdom^ in understanding the nature of assertion Bis to see that asserting and inferring
are internally related practices, in the sense that each is PP-necessary for the other.^17
So, in order to accurately capture the meaning-use relations for conditionals, we need to
augment the lower right-hand interior box in the diagram in Fig. 2 by having the
conjunction of inferring and asserting as PP-sufficient for the practice of using condi-
tionals. But now the problem crops up elsewhere. Even if we grant that the conjoint
practice of inferring-and-asserting is PP-sufficient for the practice of using conditionals
and that this practice is, in turn, PV-sufficient for the mastery of the conditional, it is
simply false that the conditional locution is VP-sufficient for the practice of inferring-
and-asserting. Moreover, this is so irrespective of whether one adopts a descriptive or
an expressive conception of the VP-sufficiency relation.
Consider the options. On the descriptive reading, the ‘if__then__’ locution would
need to describe the practice of inferring-and-asserting, which it clearly does not: any
more than ‘not’ describes the practice of treating two claims as incompatible. On the
alternative expressive reading, the ‘if__then__’ locution would need to make explicit
the practice of inferring-and-asserting. But even if we grant that the conditional makes
the practice of inferring explicit, it surely does not make inferring-and-asserting
explicit. To see this, we need only reflect upon the vocabulary that would make
asserting explicit. According to one familiar proposal, for example, the Fregean
assertion stroke (├) can be used to express assertoric force. But on the face of it, the
conditional, by itself, does not obviate the need for the assertion sign, any more than,
say, disjunction does. When one asserts a conditional one does not thereby assert either
the antecedent or the consequent. Moreover, in expressing conditionals, one does not
thereby resolve the force of the utterance since conditionals can, like most other
expressions, figure in assertions, suppositions, queries, commands, and so on. Thus,
however we construe VP-sufficiency (whether descriptively or expressively) condi-
tionals are not VP-sufficient for the practice of inferring-and-asserting.
In sum: The practice of inferring, by itself, is not PP-sufficient for the practice of
using conditionals. Perhaps the practice of inferring-and-asserting is PP-sufficient for
the practice of using conditionals. But even if this is true, conditionals are not VP-
sufficient for the practice of inferring-and-asserting. Thus, either Condition 2 fails or
Condition 4 fails. Either way, conditionals turn out not to be LX, much less universal
LX.
17 Brandom (2008: 42).
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6 Modal Vocabulary is Not Universal LX (or Why the Modal Kant-Sellars
Thesis is False)
In the preceding sections we argued at some length that Brandom’s primary example of
logical vocabulary – the conditional – is not universal LX. Since the claim that logical
vocabulary is universal LX is amongst the central claims of Between Saying and Doing,
and since the conditional is the only piece of logical vocabulary that he considers at any
length, we take this to pose a serious problem for his project. We now propose to
challenge another central thesis of the book – what Brandom calls the modal Kant-
Sellars thesis—roughly, the claim that modal vocabulary (e.g., ‘possible’, ‘necessary’,
and ‘contingent’) is universal LX. More specifically, we maintain that it is subject to
exactly analogous problems to those set out earlier.
6.1 The Modal Kant-Sellars Thesis and Its Philosophical Significance
As noted in Section 2.1, a central goal of Brandom’s project in Between Saying and
Doing is to argue for the thesis, which he calls the modal Kant-Sellars thesis, on which
modal vocabulary has a privileged status akin to logical vocabulary.
Via an extensive discussion that focuses primarily on Sellars – but takes in Ryle,
Kripke, and Quine along the way – Brandom fashions a characterization of the
modal Kant-Sellars thesis that conforms to the pragmatic conception of meaning
so central to Brandom’s overarching project. In particular, the version of the
modal Kant-Sellars thesis that he endorses is formulated as the conjunction of
two claims:
1. In using ordinary empirical vocabulary, one already knows how to do everything
one needs to know how to do in order to introduce and deploy modal vocabulary.
2. The expressive role characteristic of alethic modal vocabulary is to make explicit
semantic, conceptual connections and commitments that are already implicit in the
use of ordinary empirical vocabulary.
As Brandom observes, this formulation of the modal Kant-Sellars thesis is amena-
ble, with minimal modification, to the sort of meaning-use analysis that we have
already encountered. Claim 1 maintains that some set of practices that are PV-
necessary for the use of any empirical vocabulary are PP-sufficient for practices that
are PV-sufficient to deploy modal vocabulary. Claim 2 maintains that modal vocabulary
makes explicit – is VP-sufficient for – those aspects of practices that are implicit in –
i.e., PV-necessary for – the use of any empirical vocabulary whatsoever. Thus, accord-
ing to Brandom’s modal Kant-Sellars thesis, modal vocabulary is universal LX. This is
represented diagrammatically in Fig. 3 (‘CRI’ stands for ‘counterfactually robust
inference’, to be explained below).
There is a crucial component of Brandom’s discussion of the modal Kant-Sellars
thesis that we have yet to touch upon. From inspection of Fig. 3, it is clear that the
thesis requires that there be some set of practices – corresponding to the bottom-right
interior box – that satisfies three conditions:
& It is PV-necessary for using any empirical vocabulary;
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& It is PP-sufficient for those practices PV-sufficient for deploying modal vocabulary;
and
& Modal vocabulary is VP-sufficient for these practices.
Yet as formulated no commitment is made regarding what these practices
are. This is a gap that Brandom fills in the course of arguing for the modal
Kant-Sellars thesis.
In brief, his argumentative strategy is to justify the thesis by showing that
there is a practice that satisfies the above conditions. What might it be? His
answer is that it is the capacity for what he calls Bcounterfactually robust
inference^: the capacity to associate a range of Bcounterfactual robustness^
with each materially good inference. 18 In other words, he maintains that
mastery of any empirical vocabulary requires that one be able to distinguish
the counterfactual conditions in which an inference would fail from those in
which it would go through. For otherwise one would not count as possessing
the relevant empirical concepts.19
18 Brandom (2008: 103).
19 Brandom illustrates the point with the following example: BOne grasps the claim ‘the lioness is hungry’
only insofar as one takes it to have various consequences (which would be true if it were true) and to rule out
some others (which would not be true if it were true). And it is not intelligible that one should endorse as
materially good an inference involving it, such as the inference from ‘the lioness is hungry’ to ‘nearby prey
animals visible to and accessible by the lioness are in danger of being eaten,’ but be disposed to make no
distinction at all between collateral premises that would, and those that would not, if true infirm the inference.^
(p. 105)
Fig. 3 A meaning-use diagram for modal vocabulary
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6.2 Why Brandom’s Modal Kant-Sellars Thesis is False
Although we do not deny the general thesis that modal notions are in some way implicit
in ordinary descriptive, linguistic practices, we do reject the claim that modal vocab-
ulary is universal LX, and with it Brandom’s specific formulation of the modal Kant-
Sellars thesis. Moreover, our line of criticism is exactly analogous to the objection we
leveled against the claim that the conditional is universal LX in Section 4.2.
In order to have mastery of modal locutions, one must also be able to engage in the
practice of asserting—i.e. PModal in Fig. 3 must involve the ability to make assertions.
This is a point that Brandom himself would readily endorse and for precisely the same
reason mentioned in the case of the conditional. But if this is so, then the practice of
counterfactually robust inferring (hereon CRI) is not PP-sufficient for the practice of
using modal notions, and so modal vocabulary (on this construal of the diagram) is not
universal LX.
Now, as with the case of the conditional, one might respond to this problem by
maintaining that the capacity for asserting is PP-necessary for the capacity for CRI and
vice versa. In which case, to capture the meaning-use relations for modals, we need to
augment the lower interior right-hand box in the diagram by having the conjunction of
CRI and asserting as PP-sufficient for the practice of using modal locutions. But just as
before, the problem now crops up elsewhere. Even if we grant that the conjoint practice
of CRI-and-asserting is PP-sufficient for the practice of using conditionals, and that this
practice is, in turn, PV-sufficient for the mastery of modals, it is simply false that modal
locutions are VP-sufficient for the practice of CRI-and-asserting. Moreover, this is so
irrespective of whether one adopts a descriptive or an expressive conception of the VP-
sufficiency relation.
Consider the options. On the descriptive reading, modal locutions would need to
describe the practice of CRI-and-asserting, which they clearly do not: any more than
‘not’ describes the practice of treating two claims as incompatible. On the alternative
expressive reading, modal locutions would need to make explicit the practice of CRI-
and-asserting. But even if we grant that modals make the practice of CRI explicit, they
surely do not make CRI-and-asserting explicit. To see this, we need only reflect again
upon the vocabulary that would make asserting explicit. According to one familiar
proposal, for example, the Fregean assertion stroke can be used to express assertoric
force. But on the face of it, modal vocabulary, by itself does not obviate the need for the
assertion sign, any more than, say, the conditional does. Thus, whichever way we
construe VP-sufficiency – whether it be descriptively or expressively – modals are not
VP-sufficient for the practice of CRI-and-asserting.
In sum: The practice of CRI, by itself, is not PP-sufficient for the practice of using
modals. Perhaps the practice of CRI-and-asserting is PP-sufficient for the practice of
using modals. But even if this is true, modals are not VP-sufficient for the practice of
CRI-and-asserting. Thus, either Condition 2 fails or Condition 4 fails. Either way
modals turn out not to be LX, much less universal LX.
6.3 The Normative Kant-Sellars Thesis
We have argued that the modal Kant-Sellars thesis fails. But those familiar with
Between Saying and Doingmight wonder whether any of this applies to what Brandom
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calls the normative Kant-Sellars thesis: the claim that in order to apply ordinary,
empirical, descriptive vocabulary – and hence to deploy any autonomous vocabulary
whatsoever – one must already be able to do everything needed to introduce normative
vocabulary.20 This thesis is defended in tandem with the modal version of the Kant-
Sellars thesis. Moreover, Brandom appears to suppose that the two theses are strongly
analogous, being answers to two variants of a single issue:
Kant read Hume's theoretical and practical philosophies as raising variants of a
single question. On the side of theoretical reasoning, Hume asks what our warrant
is for moving from descriptions of what in fact happens to characteriza-
tions of what must happen, and what could not happen. How, he wants to
know, can we rationally justify the move from descriptions of matter-of-
factual regularities to formulations of necessary laws? On the side of
practical reasoning, Hume asks what our warrant is for moving from
descriptions of how things are to prescriptions of how they ought to be.
How, he wants to know, can we rationally justify the move from ‘is’ to
‘ought’? …
As we have seen, on the modal side, Kant's response is that Hume's predicament
is not a real one. One cannot in fact fully understand the descriptive, empirical
employment of ordinary determinate concepts such as cat without at least im-
plicitly understanding also what is made explicit by the modal concepts that
articulate laws. Kant mounts a corresponding line of thought on the side of
normative or practical necessity. Normative concepts make explicit commitments
that are implicit in any use of concepts, whether theoretically in judgment or
practically in acting intentionally.21
In view of this apparently tight connection between the two Kant-Sellars theses one
might wonder whether the normative version is subject to the same problems we level
against the modal version.
We suspect that the normative Kant-Sellars thesis is unscathed by the sorts of
considerations raised above. In order to see this, consider the meaning-use diagram
that Brandom provides for the normative Kant-Sellars thesis (‘GAR’ stands for ‘the
game of giving and asking for reasons’) Fig. 4.
In order for normative vocabulary to be universal LX, it must be VP-sufficient for
some practice that is, in turn, PP-sufficient for the practice of using normative
vocabulary. According to Brandom the practice in question is giving and asking
for reasons. But this practice is – and this is the crucial point – one that
incorporates the practice of assertion. Giving a reason just is a kind of
asserting. But if this is so, then we have no reason to doubt that it is PP-
sufficient for the practice of using normative vocabulary. Thus no analog of our
earlier objections can be run for the present case.22
20 Anyone familiar with Brandom’s earlier work,Making It Explicit, should recognize that such a thesis about
normative vocabulary is central to Brandom’s philosophical position.
21 Brandom (2008: 109-110).
22 This is not, of course, to deny that some other objection might apply. But we put such issues to aside here.
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7 Intentionality as a Pragmatically Mediated Relation
The final central thesis of Brandom’s Between Saying and Doing concerns the nature of
intentionality – the world-directed character of language and thought – that we call the
pragmatically mediated conception of intentionality. In our view, this proposal is of
profound importance to the overarching project of Analytic Pragmatism. Yet
Brandom’s discussion is underdeveloped and, at times, frustratingly obscure. With this
in mind, we propose to start with a careful and charitable reconstruction of the proposal.
Having done so, we show that the arguments of the foregoing sections provide reason
to reject the proposal.
7.1 Motivation: A Persistent Criticism of Semantic Pragmatism
One way to appreciate the central motivation for – and significance of – Brandom’s
pragmatically mediated conception of intentionality is to start by focusing on a
persistent criticism of the semantic assumptions of Analytic Pragmatism. More or less
by definition, Analytic Pragmatism is committed to Semantic Pragmatism: the thesis
that linguistic meaning is determined by use. Moreover, the sorts of analyses that
Brandom seeks to provide consist in specifying the linguistic practices on which our
mastery of various vocabularies are thought to depend. But as Brandom himself readily
acknowledges, there is a worry that such analyses are, in fact, not semantic at all; and
not for any reason that has anything specific to do with the particular analyses that he
advocates. Rather, the worry is quite general. Such analyses fail to be semantic – and
hence to do the work required of them by Analytic Pragmatism – because they conform
Fig. 4 A meaning-use diagram for normative vocabulary
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to the general precepts of Semantic Pragmatism, and Semantic Pragmatism is unsatis-
factory as an account of semantic properties. On such a view, meaning is ultimately to
be understood in terms of the linguistic practices in which we engage, not the relations
that terms bear to aspects of the world. But according to many, semantics, if it is
anything, is concerned with precisely such word-world relations – e.g., with represen-
tation, truth, and reference.23 In which case, it may seem that to the extent that Analytic
Pragmatism seeks to provide semantic analyses, it is doomed to fail. Thus whatever else
the value of pragmatic analysis, it cannot be a satisfactory extension of the project
initiated by Frege, Russell and Moore.
7.2 The Pragmatist Responds
One obvious response to the above concern is simply to deny that semantics is centrally
concerned with word-world relations. Yet clearly this is not Brandom’s response.
Rather, he thinks that there is something importantly right about the idea that semantic
properties involve word-world relations. The challenge, then, is to explain why this is
so in a manner consistent with Semantic Pragmatism. This is precisely the role that his
account of intentionality is supposed to fill.
Step 1: The Nature of Practices Brandom’s response can be viewed as having two
main steps. The first is driven by what he takes to be a very general fact about the
nature of practices, which he views as a central claim of the pragmatist tradition. Of
course language use qua practice involves relations between subjects and the world
because in general practices involve aspects of the world: they are thick.24 To take some
simple examples, the practice of cooking cannot be adequately characterized absent
such things as food items and kitchen utensils; and the practice of drinking tea cannot
be adequately characterized without reference to such things as cups, saucers, and, of
course, tea leaves. But such components of the practices are also aspects of the world,
and thus the existence of these practices carry a commitment to subject-world relations.
And what goes for cooking and tea drinking is also true of language use. Qua practice,
it too ineliminably involves subject-world relations.
So there is a sense in which, according to Brandom, the worry with which we started
is no objection at all. That is, if the concern is that Semantic Pragmatism severs the
connection between word and world, then the concern is misplaced. At best it is an
artifact of assuming that the relevant practices ought to be characterized Bthinly ,^ in
such a way as to avoid reference to aspects of the world. But as Brandom clearly
recognizes, this does not settle the matter. The real problem for the semantic pragmatist
is not that there are no relations between language-using subjects and the
world. On the contrary, there are a great many such relations. Such relations
are cheap. The real problem for semantic pragmatists is specifying the right
relation(s) – those relevant for the purposes of characterizing the intentional
character of language use; and this, according to Brandom, requires a more
detailed, pragmatist account of intentionality.
23 See Rosen (2001) for example. As David Lewis once wrote in this spirit, Bsemantics with no treatment of
truth conditions is not semantics^ (Lewis 1983: 190).
24 Brandom labels this principle P3; Brandom (2008: 178).
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Step 2: Combining the Accounts of Modal and Normative Vocabulary To appre-
ciate Brandom’s account of intentionality one needs first to make three general points
clear. The first, already hinted at above, is that he views intentionality of the sort
manifested by the practice of language use as a specific instance of a broader phenom-
enon, manifested by all human practices, which he calls practical intentionality.
Practices quite generally, you may recall, involve relations between subjects and
aspects of the world. Further, as Brandom notes, practices invariably involve what he
calls practical intentionality: feedback-governed relations in which the results of earlier
actions are used as guides to future, goal-directed behavior. This is true, for example, of
cooking and tea drinking, but also football kicking and everything else for that matter,
including language use. According to Brandom, then, the semantic intentionality
characteristic of language use is best thought of as a specific instance of practical
intentionality.25
The second point concerns the order of explanation one ought to adopt in explaining
semantic intentionality. According to Brandom, some traditions26 purport to start with
independent conceptions of the states of the subject that represent and of the entities so
represented, and then seek to characterize the nature of the intentional relation that
holds between them—to somehow Bbolt^ them together.27
Brandom maintains that such an approach is wrong-headed in that it gets the proper
order of explanation exactly backwards, and thereby ignores precisely that which
allows for intentionality in the first place: Bthe thick, essentially world-involving
practices^ in which we engage.28 In its place, Brandom proposes that should start, as
traditional pragmatists have advocated, with the world-involving practices themselves;
and only characterize intentionality and its relata as a kind of abstraction from these
practices.29 Thus it is only by taking our rich, thickly characterized linguistic practices
as primary and subjecting them to careful enquiry that, according to Brandom, we have
any hope of understanding the general phenomenon of semantic intentionality.30
The final general point concerns the specific practices most central to explaining
intentionality. According to Brandom, the most central are those concerned with our
use of normative and modal vocabularies. Indeed his strategy is, in effect, to explain
intentionality by combining the two Kant-Sellars Theses discussed in Section 5, and
seeking to draw out certain consequences of their joint endorsement. In Section 6.3 we
argue that this strategy does not work. But first some further unpacking is in order.
Recall: for Brandom, though an explanation of semantic intentionality requires an
account of the relevant subject-world relations, such an account is to be provided by
abstraction from the relevant linguistic practices. The primary task, then, is to supply an
adequate account of the relevant practices; and for Brandom the two central practices
25 Brandom labels this claim P4; Brandom (2008: 179).
26 Though he does not explicitly mention any philosophical theories that cleave this methodology, we suspect
that he has in mind, amongst other things, causal theories of content, such as those advocated by Fodor and
Dretske; see Dretske 1981) and Fodor (1992).
27 Brandom (2008: 179).
28 Brandom (2008: 180).
29 Historical note: This sort of view was characteristic of the views of pragmatists, such as Dewey and James,
but similar views can also be found in Russell (1945: 812) among others.
30 Superficial appearances not withstanding, Brandom is not claiming that there could be no objective world
without the existence of our linguistic practices. His purpose is not to advocate some kind of linguistic
idealism, but instead to defend an approach to the study of intentionality.
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are those concerning modal vocabulary and normative vocabulary, since they inform us
about the relata of semantic intentional relations: the world and the rational subject,
respectively. The practices made explicit by modal vocabulary (CRI) impose con-
straints on the modal structure of reality. Roughly, they reflect constraints, implicit in
our thought and language, on ways that the world could be and must be. In contrast, the
practices made explicit by normative vocabulary (GAR) impose constraints on rational
agency. Roughly, they tell us what is it to be a rational subject – a producer and
consumer of reasons. Thus for Brandom these linguistic practices, though not them-
selves the poles of intentional relations, are crucial to explicating the nature of
intentionality, because it is by providing appropriately perspicuous characterizations
of them that we are able, by abstraction, to reconstruct the nature of the relata.
So far so good. But an account of intentionality must do more than merely explicate
those practices that concern the relata. Rather, one needs to explain how each of these
practices are related to each other so as to yield the larger practice on which semantic
intentionality depends. In effect, Brandom must address an analog of the problem that
confronts more traditional approaches to intentionality of the sort that he rejects. For as
we have already noted, on some approaches to the explanation of intentionality, the
challenge is to specify the relevant relation between the relata: i.e., subject and world.
For Brandom, the challenge is to specify the relationship between two practices: the
world-oriented practices made explicit by modal vocabulary and the subject-oriented
practices made explicit by normative vocabulary.
How is this to be done? Brandom’s answer is that the two practices intersect in what
he calls rational rectification, which is the practice by which new commitments are
integrated into one’s cognitive economy – one’s system of beliefs, desires, goals, and
other intentional states. Such a practice involves the modification of one’s
beliefs – often in the light of new information – so as to eliminate inconsis-
tencies among one’s current commitments. But the capacity to do so presup-
poses a capacity to recognize inconsistencies, which in turn presupposes a
capacity to engage in inferences that draw out the consequences of one’s
current beliefs. According to Brandom, all of these cognitive capacities are
aspects of the practice made explicit by use of modal vocabulary; and thus are
implicit in the practice of rational rectification.
But there is more to rational rectification than this. Rational rectification requires
more of us than the mere capacity to recognize inconsistency – and whatever inferential
capacities this, in turn, presupposes. Among other things, this alone would be compat-
ible with continuing to endorse inconsistent commitments. In addition to this, rational
rectification requires that one take oneself to have an obligation to eliminate such
inconsistencies – to structure one’s commitments in such a way as not to violate facts
about the modal structure of the world. And according to Brandom, the practice of
having one’s commitments conform to such constraints are amongst those made
explicit by our use of normative vocabulary.
It is time to bring all the pieces together. What we have said so far on the topic
intentionality is quite impressionistic; and indeed most of Brandom’s own discussion is
similarly gestural. Nevertheless, in accord with his practice elsewhere in the book,
when Brandom seeks to spell out his views precisely, he presents a meaning-use
diagram. In the case of intentionality, the diagram that he uses to distill his views is
reproduced as Fig. 5.
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Although there is a lot going on here, we restrict ourselves to the following
observations. First, the diagram aims to depict a kind of practice – indeed any practice
of using an autonomous vocabulary – as an object for which intentional vocabulary is
VP-sufficient – i.e., either made explicit by or describable by intentional vocabulary.
Second, the diagram represents any autonomous discursive practice as incorporating
two essential components: a practice made explicit by modal vocabulary and a practice
made explicit by normative vocabulary.31 Thus the diagram represents mastery of such
practices as necessary for being a language-user at all.
Finally, the diagram represents anyone who can engage in these two practices as
being capable, in principle, of deploying the vocabularies that make these practices
explicit – i.e., modal and normative vocabulary. In other words, the diagram represents
the fact that Brandom’s account of intentionality – in conjunction with the earlier
discussed claims regarding modal and normative vocabulary – entails the modal and
normative Kant-Sellars theses. This is important for present purposes, because by tying
his account of intentionality to his previous claims about modality and normativity,
Brandom provides a partial explication of the nature of the practices on which
intentionality depends. As we noted earlier, the real challenge for a pragmatic account
of intentionality of the sort advocated by Brandom is to explicate the word-world
relations that is relevant to intentionality; and with respect to this task, the primary
significance of the Kant-Sellars theses is that they permit Brandom is specify central
31 Brandom uses the term ‘discursive’ as a general term for any activity in which only rational entities can
engage.
Fig. 5 This figure has three arrows numbered for ease of reference below. See Fig. 6.1 on Brandom (2008:
183)
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aspects of the relevant practices. Brandom is thus relying on his earlier discussion of
modality and normativity in order to flesh out his account of intentionality.
7.3 An Objection
In view of our earlier discussion, one problem with Brandom’s proposed account of
intentionality should be clear. As we have already seen, modal vocabulary is
not universal LX. So, there might be a language user that cannot already do
everything needed to be able to use modal vocabulary; and if that is right, then
the account of semantic intentionality, as represented in Fig. 5, obviously cannot
be right.
How deep does this objection go? To see the significance of the objection, we need
to rehearse some aspects of our earlier discussion, and introduce some features of
Brandom’s theory of content. First, recall that we showed earlier that the practice of
counterfactually robust inference is not PP-sufficient for the practice of using modal
vocabulary. But this is just to deny that arrow 1 in Fig. 5 holds. In other words, the
practice labeled Pobj-modal in Fig. 5 is not PP-sufficient for the practice of using modal
vocabulary; and this means that Brandom has failed to characterize adequately the
nature of the practice that, on his view, mediates the intentionality relation. In particular,
if our arguments from Section 5 are correct, then the aspect of the practice that is
supposed to explicate the Bworld pole^ of the intentionality relation has not have been
accurately characterized.
Of course, this is not the end of the matter. Following the dialectic set out in
Section 5, Brandom might seek to preserve the connection between Pobj-modal and the
practices sufficient for the use of modal vocabulary by enriching Pobj-modal. Specifically,
he might add the assumption that Pobj-modal is constituted, in part, by the ability to make
assertions. If such a maneuver is pursued, then our earlier objection to arrow 1 fails. But
now – just as before – the problem crops up elsewhere. Though arrow 2 holds more or
less by definition, arrow 3 fails. That is, as argued earlier, we no longer have any reason
to suppose that modal vocabulary is VP-sufficient for Pobj-modal. In which case, modal
vocabulary still fails to be universal LX, and the modal Kant-Sellars Thesis is false. As
a consequence, even if one pursues this escape route, Brandom’s pragmatic theory of
intentionality, at least as represented by Fig. 5, is false.
One might, however, accept our criticism and yet insist that the objection is easily
met so as to preserve the spirit, though not the letter, of Brandom’s account of
intentionality. Specifically, it seems eminently reasonable to ask why the account of
intentionality as such should require that modal vocabulary be VP-sufficient for Pobj-
modal. Clearly, on anything like Brandom’s view, Pobj-modal should be PP-sufficient for
Pmodal. Absent this connection Brandom would, by his own lights, have failed to
explicate the Bworld pole^ of the intentionality relation. Further, on anything like
Brandom’s account, a relation of PV-sufficiency must hold between Pmodal and Vmodal.
After all, on his view, the existence of such a connection obtains more or less by
definition. In contrast, it is utterly unclear why the account of intentionality requires that
V
modal
be VP-sufficient for Pobj-modal and, hence, that modal vocabulary be universal LX.
To the extent that we concerned only with the account of intentionality, then, such a
commitment seems entirely optional.
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There is a sense in which we think that this response is entirely correct. Brandom’s
approach to intentionality, need not – and indeed should not – demand that Vmodal be
VP-sufficient for Pobj-modal. But we think that the assumption that it should is deeply
engrained in Brandom’s views about semantics and, hence, that preserving the
Brandonian approach to intentionality requires that one give up a deep-seated commit-
ment of Brandom’s philosophical worldview, sometimes called expressive equilibrium.
In our experience, the issue is not easily appreciated; and so we propose to creep up on
the relevant assumption by first considering another assumption – expressive complete-
ness – also deep-seated in Brandom’s philosophy, that does not suffice to mandate the
commitment to arrow 3, but that does motivate the endorsement of expressive
equilibrium
Expressive Completeness Brandom is, of course, a semantic pragmatist, and so his
theory of content takes the form of a theory of those discursive practices that are
adequate to confer semantic content on the expressions involved. Expressive complete-
ness is invoked as a condition of adequacy on such a theory. To a first approximation,
expressive completeness requires that a theory of discursive practices should, in
principle, be available to its practitioners. In other words, an adequate semantic theory
should explain how linguistic expressions acquire their content in such a way that
practitioners are, in principle, able to use the theory in order to explain the practices in
which they participate. A corollary of this – one that is central to appreciating the
significance of this constraint – is that such a theory will apply to itself. That is, an
expressively complete semantic theory will correctly explain how the very linguistic
expressions that comprise the theory acquire their meanings.
Why endorse such a commitment? Though we will not explore the issue in detail
here, the central motivation is to avoid the sorts of self-refutation worries that notori-
ously confront various historically influential theories of meaning, most notably early
versions of verificationism, but also Wittgenstein’s Tractarian account of meaning.32
Clearly, an expressively complete theory will not confront this problem since such
theories are self-applicable – that is, they provide a meaning theory for the expressions
in the theory itself.
Be that as it may, the assumption of expressive completeness alone fails to explain
Brandom’s commitment to the VP-sufficiency of Vmodal for Pobj-modal. This is because
the mere commitment to expressive completeness very obviously does not demand that
modal expressions make explicit the practices on which they depend. On the face of it,
all that is required is that the theory not be self-defeating – that the theory possess the
resources to explain how the expressions of the theory themselves acquire their
meanings. What does require VP-sufficiency, however, is the strategy that Brandom
adopts in order to ensure the expressive completeness of his preferred approach to
semantic theorizing – what he calls expressive equilibrium.
Expressive Equilibrium To a first approximation, the requirement for expressive
equilibrium is the requirement that the broad category of logical vocabulary – which,
for Brandom, includes traditional logical connectives and quantifiers, but also norma-
tive and modal notions – makes explicit not only those norms that confer content on
32 Wittgenstein (1922).
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non-logical vocabulary, but those norms that confer content on logical vocabulary as
well. To see the significance of this notion for Brandom’s semantic project we need to
rehearse briefly the overall structure of the approach to semantic properties that
Brandom adopts. Roughly put, he advocates a two-part approach:
1) The basic theory: This describes what might be called basic discursive practices –
i.e. those involving no logical vocabulary. This theory will, of course, use logical
vocabulary, but it will not explain how such expressions get their meanings.
2) The extended theory: This describes the extended discursive practices in which
language-users engage – i.e., those involving logical vocabulary. More specifically,
it does so by showing how basic discursive practices can be extended by the
introduction of logical vocabulary.
Now as we have seen, the overall theory – comprised of both the basic and extended
theories – needs to be expressively complete. Failing that, one risks self-defeat prob-
lems of sort that stymied verificationism. Yet clearly, participants in the basic practice
lack the resources to state the basic theory because they posses no logical
vocabulary at all. In which case, the basic theory is self-defeating. That is
where the extended theory enters the picture. This theory explains how to
introduce logical vocabulary – including modal and normative vocabulary –
into the basic practice. So, participants in the extended practice – i.e., the
practice described by the extended theory – possess the vocabulary required
to state the basic theory. But now the problem recurs. In order to ensure
expressive completeness of the extended theory, such practitioners must not
merely have access to the basic theory, but to the extended theory as well.
Otherwise, we (once more) risk regress.
Brandom’s proposed solution is that logical vocabulary is in expressive equilibrium
—that it makes explicit not only those norms that confer content on non-logical
vocabulary, but those norms that confer content on logical vocabulary as well. And
in the parlance of Between Saying and Doing, this is just the claim that logical
vocabulary, broadly construed to include normative and modal vocabulary, makes
explicit the very practices that one needs to master in order to possess logical vocab-
ulary itself. In short: the notion of universal LX vocabulary is a way of making more
precise the demand for expressive equilibrium: a demand that Brandom thinks is central
to an account of meaning that avoids self-defeat.
We are now in a position to summarize our major concerns about Brandom’s view of
intentionality. First, as noted earlier, our objections to the modal Kant-Sellars thesis in
Section 5 show that the view as stated is false. Second, there is no reason internal to the
theory of intentionality to assume that modal vocabulary is universal LX. At most the
theory of intentionality per se requires arrows 1 and 2 – not arrow 3 – because it is the
first two connections that are involved in specifying the discursive practices relevant to
explicating the Bworld pole^ of the intentionality relation.
Third, arrow 3 is required if one seeks to endorse both the account of intentionality
and the strategy for ensuring expressive completeness. But this is just because it is
required by the theory of expressive completeness. In other words, arrow 3 comes not
from the theory of intentionality but from Brandom’s strategy for achieving expressive
completeness for his pragmatist theory of meaning.
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Finally, once one sees the problem, it should be clear that arrow 3 is demanded by
expressive equilibrium, irrespective of what account of intentionality Brandom en-
dorses. That is, once one adopts expressive equilibrium as a way of attaining expressive
completeness, it needs to be the case that modal vocabulary is VP-sufficient for Pobj-
modal; and more generally, that logical vocabulary, broadly construed, is VP-sufficient
for those practices needed to master exactly that logical vocabulary. What our argu-
ments in the earlier sections of this paper show is that this strategy cannot succeed.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
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link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
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